W
hile the integrity of a public offi cial is multifaceted and complex, it certainly includes the endorsement of values enshrined in the constitution that, in the words of the late John Rohr (1986) , he or she has to "run." But what if these values clash violently in a moral dilemma? Such is the predicament of the police offi cer in the following real-life case.
On September 27, 2002, Jakob von Metzler, son of a Frankfurt-based private banker, is kidnapped by 27-year-old law student Magnus Gäfgen. In a letter to Jakob's parents, Gäfgen demands a ransom of 1 million euros. Two days later, the kidnapper is identifi ed while collecting the money. Th e next day, on September 30, Gäfgen is arrested by the Frankfurt police. During interrogation, Gäfgen consistently misinforms his interrogators as to the whereabouts of Jakob. At one point, Gäfgen tells them to go and take a look at a cottage near a lake not far from Frankfurt. In the cottage, police offi cers fi nd a bed with bloodstained blankets. Th ey surmise that if Jakob is still alive, he is likely to be in serious danger.
In the early morning hours of October 1, 2002, all this is reported to the responsible offi cer, Wolfgang Daschner, vice president of the Frankfurt police. After 20 minutes of agonizing deliberation, Daschner orders Gäfgen's interrogators to threaten him with what is in eff ect a (relatively mild) form of torture. When the latter is confronted with the threat, he at once gives way. Gäfgen reveals that Jakob is no longer alive. On October 14, he gives a full confession. More than half a year later, on July 27, 2003, he is convicted for abduction and homicide. He is sent to prison for the rest of his life.
Having issued the order, Daschner informs the Staatsanwalt, or public prosecutor. Th e public prosecutor, who, according to German penal law, has no discretionary authority to decide whether or not to prosecute, has no choice but to start an investigation. Meanwhile, Daschner is demoted as a result of an internal disciplinary measure. His new task consists of performing menial administrative chores, awaiting his case to be examined in court. On February 20, 2004 , Daschner is indicted, and in December of that year, he is convicted. Th e sentence is mild: he gets a conditional fi ne (Verwarnung mit Strafvorbehalt) of 10,800 euros. Th e relevant article of the German penal code ( § 59 Strafgezetzbuch), which is seldom applied, makes it possible to punish someone formally without punishing him materially. Th e newspapers aptly comment that Daschner has been convicted but not punished. Th e case again receives a lot of exposure in the German media in 2011. In August of that year, Gäfgen successfully seeks compensation for having been threatened with torture by the authorities: the state has to pay him 3,000 euros (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 10, 2012) . A wave of public moral indignation washes over Germany. Th e reputable German weekly Die Zeit comments, "Rechtens, aber nicht richtig" (Legal, but not right) (Die Zeit, August 4, 2011) .
Cases of this kind should make a citizen of any liberal democracy think-and think hard. Such a case brings
Confl icts of Values and Political Forgiveness
is that the very label "liberal democracy" captures a deep confl ict that is at the heart of all constitutions deserving it. In the extreme case, the individual, deserving the protection of his or her inalienable rights, stands alone against the overwhelming majority. If it seeks redress in court, that frequently means a confl ict of values has been well under way for some time. Admittedly, this is not the only type of confl ict found in the running of a liberal democracy. But what is important is that this type of confl ict is hardwired into its constitutional substance. Th erefore, it is not just a quirk of fate that such confl icts occur. On the contrary, it is part of the very purpose of a liberal democracy. One could even say that this type of confl ict of values is itself a good. It forces public offi cials to constantly renegotiate constitutional priorities, thereby keeping the relevant values alive.
Rights constrain the choices that individual offi cials have to make because of their special status. Th is status is special in at least two respects. In the fi rst place, rights are (in the words of Ronald Dworkin) "trumps" (Dworkin 1977) . Th ey have to have a particularly strong claim against other kinds of value. Second, rights are justifi ed in a way that is nonconsequentialist. Th at is to say, rights are conceived of as intrinsically valuable, not just because respecting them has benefi cial consequences. Th is is the reason rights are often formulated in an absolute way. For instance, Article 2.2 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture reads, "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justifi cation of torture" (emphasis added).
1 Making rights subject to the consequentialist (or utilitarian) calculus puts them on a slippery slope-and a slippery slope is a "natural progression" toward humanitarian disaster (Williams 1985) .
By contrast, the justifi cation of general welfare claims is particularly hospitable to utilitarian justifi cation-which is why in modern liberal democracies, utilitarianism is considered the "leading public philosophy" (Goodin 1995) . Th is means that pitting rights against welfare claims not only results in a confl ict between diff erent kinds of constitutional value in liberal democracy. It also means that we have here a confl ict between diff erent patterns of justifi cation of those values. Th e strict absolutist will respect the intrinsic nature of rights, regardless of the consequences, while the die-hard utilitarian has to consider only their consequences. Th is means that the confl ict between individual rights and a democratic conception of the common good that is typical of liberal democracy is a manifestation of a deeper confl ict. Th e origin of this deeper confl ict is moral or value pluralism.
2 Th e central claim of value pluralism is that (1) our moral universe contains a plurality of fi nal ends that (2) may confl ict in such a way that no rational way out is possible (3) without remainder (Berlin 1969; Crowder 1994; Galston 2002 Galston , 2005 Hampshire 1983 Hampshire , 1989 Hampshire , 1999 Kekes 1993; Larmore 1987 Larmore , 1996 Larmore , 2008 Raz 1986; Williams 1981 ).
As to (1), a plurality of values is a presupposition of true moral confl ict. But that does not mean that the amount of fi nal ends is indefinite. Value pluralists usually hasten to point out that they are not moral relativists. Th e latter hold that the value systems of diff erent cultures with specifi c moral outlooks cannot be rationally compared sharp focus to the complex relationships between a society's moral intuitions, its formal institutions, and the demands of everyday administrative practice. Th e case may duly be characterized as a tragic one. It is a defi ning feature of tragedies that their heroes come to grief. So does Daschner. Th ere is nothing we can do about that.
Th is article refuses to indulge such resignation. It hopes to fl esh out a justifi cation for preserving offi cials like Daschner for public service. Its aim, however, is primarily diagnostic. Its central contention is that in cases like Daschner's, we should redirect our attention from the outcomes to the nature of the choice situation. It argues that those offi cials who make themselves guilty of a moral wrong in such confl icts have a right to be forgiven. Th e reason is that citizens have a right to be governed by offi cials with an acute awareness of the confl icts between the constitutional values of liberal democracy. Such an awareness is an integral part of a public offi cial's integrity. Th at is why citizens should have a say in deciding whether to remove from offi ce an offi cial with such integrity.
Th e argument unfolds as follows. Th e fi rst step shows that the confl ict of values at the heart of liberal democracies is meant to be there; it can even be considered a good thing. With the help of moral theory, this type of confl ict is translated into the terms of an individual offi cial's decision making. Th is yields two paradoxes: one focusing on the decision maker and the other on the object of his or her decisions: the citizen. Th ese paradoxes lead to the following questions: If running a liberal democratic constitution essentially involves moral complexity, should we not try to have it run by offi cials with a sensitivity to that complexity? And if offi cials with that sensitivity are bound to commit moral wrongs because of complexity, do not we owe them something like political forgiveness? Th e paradoxes are then used to formulate conditions for political forgiveness. For the purposes of the argument pursued here, I adopt the existing technical term "political forgiveness" and defi ne it as a publicly performed performative speech act that aims to create the possibility for an offi cial to continue in offi ce despite his or her violation of the moral values embodied in the constitution. However, I can only start to explain the elements of this defi nition once the paradoxes are in place.
Two caveats should be inserted before the argument starts. As indicated, the purpose of this article is to fi nd a justifi cation for forgiveness, not institutional embodiments of political forgiveness. Second, the real-life case serves mainly expository grounds. It does not try to make a substantive moral point about the rightness or wrongness of (the threat of ) torture.
Liberal Democracy as an Expression of Value Pluralism
Th e point of calling a democracy "liberal" is to indicate that it is a polity in which the rule by the majority is moderated, "tempered," or checked by mechanisms and institutions that are designed to prevent popular tyranny. Th e ways of doing this are familiar: prominently among them are individual rights and the separation of powers.
Th is is, or should be, stock knowledge. However, because it is stock knowledge, we tend to lose sight of it. What should be stressed here Citizens have a right to be governed by offi cials with an acute awareness of the confl icts between the constitutional values of liberal democracy.
So much for stage setting. Enough material has been gathered to frame two paradoxes following from this value-pluralist interpretation of liberal democracy. It should be noted that the formulations of the two paradoxes capture two diff erent perspectives: one is the perspective of the offi cial, the other that of the citizen. Th ey are, in fact, two descriptions of one and the same state of aff airs. What unites these paradoxes, despite their diff erent perspectives, is the point that on a value-pluralist construction of liberal democracy, the public offi cial not only has to be committed to the confl icting values but also to the confl ict between these values. Th is may seem a quibble, but it is not. Th e point is that it matters to the integrity of an offi cial who is aware that what he or she faces is in fact an insoluble confl ict-which is why he or she has to have an appreciation of the heterogeneous nature of the (justifi cation of the) values involved. It will turn out that this awareness plays a decisive role in answering the question of whether to mete out political forgiveness.
Two Paradoxes

Paradox 1
Unsurprisingly, the fi rst paradox concerns the moral psychology of the offi cial. Th e sense of the claim that the public offi cial is committed to the confl ict between liberal-democratic values is this: because moral confl ict is extremely painful, individual agents have a natural psychological incentive to circumvent, evade, or deny it. In general, individuals will adopt strategies, whether conscious or not, to avoid moral confl ict. Th is is not diff erent in organizational contexts, which in some respects facilitate ways of dodging responsibility. Recognizing and dealing with moral confl ict requires virtues such as truthfulness, courage, and competence, which indubitably belong to an offi cial's integrity (Nieuwenburg 2004) . So does the responsiveness to moral confl ict.
Th e fi rst paradox, then, is this: although the confl ict of values enshrined in liberal democracy may be a good thing from a constitutional point of view, it certainly is a bad thing from a psychological, subjective perspective. Th at is why it is meaningful to speak of a commitment to the confl ict itself. But this paradox also shows why it is a non-negligible accomplishment to stand up to a moral dilemma. Even possession of the virtues of truthfulness and courage does not turn moral confl ict into something easy to confront. Th erefore, from the perspective of the offi cial, strong reasons count against its acceptance. Th is is one reason not to take that acceptance as a matter of course. For it registers something that is really there: it is an institutional, even a constitutional fact (Searle 1995 (Searle , 2010 . And it is a requirement of integrity to take account of the factsand to shape one's actions accordingly.
Paradox 2
Th e formulation of the second paradox requires that we take up the perspective of the citizen. What does it mean for citizens that public offi cials are aware of a commitment to confl icting values?
To throw the importance of this awareness into relief, let us think of an offi cial, A, who is a full-blooded consequentialist. Offi cial A believes that actions are exhaustively and exclusively justifi ed by their results. If the result turns out to be good, the action is good; if the result is bad, the action is bad as well. Offi cial A decides to threaten a suspect with torture because he believes this is fully justifi ed because of the intended consequences (saving, say, hundreds of with each other as a matter of principle. Value pluralists do not claim that intercultural comparison is per se impossible. More important for present purposes is (2). Th is clause tells us that true moral confl ict cannot be solved by practical reason. Th is is because the values are incommensurable, which means that they cannot be rationally compared in terms of an overarching value. In other words, the logical structure of a moral dilemma rationally underdetermines the choice between its horns (Crowder 1994) . Finally, the phrase "without remainder" in (3) refers to the fact that by picking any alternative, we make ourselves guilty of a moral wrong. For that reason, we shall, if we are relatively normally functioning human beings, be tormented by feelings of guilt, shame, and regret. Of course, such remainders would be preempted, in principle, if the dilemma could be solved in a rationally satisfactory manner. In that case, the choice problem simply vanishes.
Signifi cantly, in newspaper interviews, Daschner described his decision as a Güterabwägung (a weighing of goods) (Frankfurter Rundschau, October 4, 2002) . Th is is signal evidence that he was aware of the value-pluralist nature of the fi x in which he found himself. If it had been a matter of "choosing the lesser of two evils," it would not have been a dilemma. Choosing the lesser of two evils assumes a way to compare them in terms of a common measure. On such an interpretation, it is perfectly rational (in utilitarian terms) to choose the lesser evil. On Daschner's own interpretation, however, he had to choose between two heterogeneous goods. He construed it as a choice between, on the one hand, the protection of an individual right and, on the other hand, a consequentialist task to protect the welfare of as many citizens as possible. Th at in his particular situation it was only one citizen does not alter the fact that the justifi cations of these values were fundamentally diff erent. It was a tragic choice, and he deeply regretted having to make it.
Th eories of value pluralism, however, address us as human beings rather than as inhabitants of a certain role or function. At least two emendations should be made to tailor value-pluralist dilemmas to the context of public organizations in a liberal democracy. In the fi rst place, public decisions are typically taken in contexts of organizational hierarchy. Hierarchy, however, promotes moral contagion, both in upward and downward directions. Contagion sinks in the hierarchical structure because the decisions of superiors have to be carried out by subordinates. Dilemmas may be, and often are, delegated down the line. And when they are, they sometimes are transformed: Should one carry out the order or be disloyal? Should Daschner's subordinates uncritically carry out his orders? Th e Adolf Eichmann case has shown that hierarchy and loyalty do not absolve the subordinate civil servant from moral responsibility (Arendt 1963) . Moral contagion also travels upward, as formal structures of responsibility often have implications for superiors who have made no (direct) causal contribution to moral wrongs committed by subordinates. Second, many decisions made in organizations have implications that transcend the boundaries of these organizations. One should not forget that the criminal judge in Daschner's case was facing a legal version of his dilemma. She could not possibly ignore the strictly absolutist claim of the fi rst article of Germany's Basic Law (to the eff ect that human dignity is inviolable, or unantastbar). On the other hand, she had to take into account the general police duty to protect German citizens (Abwehrpfl icht). Organizational decisions often spill over into other organizations.
outcome of a moral dilemma and they wish to continue in offi ce. Th is paradox shows that this should be done by giving citizens an essential part in this project: by giving them the authority to forgive the offi cial. In the last two decades or so, there has been something of a revival, or perhaps we should say a resurrection, of the concept of forgiveness in the psychological and philosophical literature (see, e.g., Calhoun 1992; Enright 2001; Enright and Fitzgibbon 2000; Govier 1999 Govier , 2002 Griswold 2007; Holmgren 1993; Lang 1994; Murphy and Hampton 1988; North 1987; Richards 1988) .
Political Forgiveness
Th e importance of the citizen perspective cannot be stressed too strongly. In the fi rst place, the account presented here is not driven by considerations of criminal and/or restorative justice (Adams and Balfour 2008; Digeser 2001; Griswold 2007, 39) . Th is is not to say that these considerations are not valid or that they should be replaced by the refl ections presented here. Th e introduction of political forgiveness is not intended to substitute for legal action, whether of a criminal or civil nature, but focuses instead on disciplinary measures. Th e point of a disciplinary measure is not retribution but the improvement of the institution. It goes without saying that improvement here includes moral improvement. Second, in a liberal democracy, all authority exercised over citizens originates in their (tacit or express) consent (Simmons 1981) . Th is in itself constitutes an important, broadly constitutional reason to at least explore the possibilities for giving citizens the authority to forgive their offi cials. Th is is a political rather than a legal take on the issue.
Th at is why the relevant concept of forgiveness discussed here is the concept of political forgiveness (Digeser 2001) . As noted, political forgiveness is here taken to consist of a formal speech act with performative force aimed at the restoration of a relationship of trust between two parties. If a linguistic utterance or speech act has performative force, it has practical or even moral consequences. It aims to have an impact on the way things are in the world, not just to report or describe them (Searle 1969) . For instance, if I say "John has promised to give me back the money by Monday," my utterance does not have performative force; it just reports a fact, namely, that John has made a promise. Th ere is no way this report can undo this fact. By contrast, if John himself says "I promise to return the money by Monday," he does not describe or report a state of aff airs in the world, but he creates a moral obligation by the very act of uttering them. It should be noted that John creates this moral obligation irrespective of his intentions. Whether he likes it or not, by uttering the sentence, John has committed himself to giving back the money. Similarly, by saying "John has forgiven Mary," I am reporting a state of aff airs. My utterance does not aim to impact that state of aff airs. But when John states to Mary, "I forgive you," his utterance aims to have an impact on a particular state of aff airs in the world, namely, John's relationship with Mary.
For a performative speech act to be successful, it has to satisfy certain conditions. Th us, in an institutional context, certain speech acts do not create social facts if the utterer does not have the authority to do so. Someone who does not have the authority to bind people in wedlock may utter the words "I hereby pronounce you innocent people). Nonetheless, he is removed from offi ce because he has committed a moral wrong. Of course, he disagrees with that removal because he believes his decision to be right without remainder. Obviously, A is the consequentialist version of Daschner. Suppose another offi cial, B, believes that torture is absolutely prohibited. No consequence, however benefi cial, can impact his commitment to that value. As a matter of fact, he does not even need to consider them, and he remains unimpressed by all if/then scenarios. By his lights, his refusal to torture is completely justifi ed. B does not torture and is removed from offi ce because of his failure to discharge his task of protecting hundreds of innocent citizens. B, it is clear, is the absolutist version of Daschner.
In terms of ethics textbooks, A and B are contraries because they represent diametrically opposed varieties of moral reasoning and valuing ("Kant versus Mill"). However, if we shift our attention from their particular ways of justifying action to their attitude toward the structure of the choice situation, A and B are very much alike. Both deny a confl ict of values. In this crucial respect, A and B diff er from Daschner. A and B are insensitive to the moral complexity of their offi ce, while Daschner does appreciate this. He knows that he has to rely on his powers of judgment in particular situations, calibrating diff erent claims, and deciding what is best. Daschner's awareness is in tune with the objective value structure of his offi ce and, by implication, of the constitution he is running. Th is makes it deeply regrettable that he suff ers the same fate as A and B. His moral sensitivity ought to be considered: it should be part and parcel of the integrity of public offi cials. It is part of their integrity because systematic neglect of patterns of justifi cation is alien to a liberal-democratic constitution.
Citizens have an interest in an executive that keeps alive both kinds of values and their justifi cations. Th e exercise of moral judgment, the marshaling of the right kinds of reason, is indispensable for this. Th erefore, it is in their interest to leave those offi cials who commit a moral wrong where they are: in offi ce. Th e second paradox may be stated as follows: if the citizen has an interest in being governed by offi cials with moral integrity, and if responsiveness to moral complexity is an essential part of public integrity, citizens have an interest in keeping those offi cials in offi ce. However, they are treated in exactly the same way as those who lack this responsiveness: they are removed from offi ce-but not by citizens.
In fact, the two paradoxes show that tragic choices are tragic twice over. Th ey are tragic from both perspectives. What the fi rst paradox shows is that offi cials need certain virtues enabling them to recognize, face, and endure moral dilemmas. Such virtues have to be acknowledged as an integral part of public integrity. Th is part of their integrity, however, takes care that they have an awareness of the tragic condition in the fi rst place. What the second paradox tells us is that it is in the interest of citizens to have morally sensitive offi cials running their constitution, but such offi cials face no better fate than those who lack this sensitivity. Th is depressing result makes one want to look for ways to retain offi cials with such virtues, even if they are guilty of a moral wrong-given that the wrong was the Political forgiveness is not intended to substitute for legal action, whether of a criminal or civil nature, but focuses instead on disciplinary measures.
Th ese arguments are not as formidable as they appear. In the fi rst place, suppose a conceptual watershed separates the public and the interpersonal that renders impossible the semantically responsible transfer of terms between these spheres. Why would the term "political apology" be a better characterization of what happens in politics than "political forgiveness"? Griswold argues that "[p]hrases such as 'we regret' or 'we apologize' when uttered in a political context are not reports of sentiments … but are speech acts aiming at some diff erent purpose … It would seem that the force of political apology is independent of sentiment or motive" (2007, . But do not the notions of apologizing and regretting similarly originate in interpersonal, and therefore psychological, contexts? Why, then, is it allowed to prefi x "political" to "apology"? And is it an insuperable conceptual problem to do the same with "forgiveness"? Is not the qualifi cation "political" meant to signal the diff erence with "real" forgiveness or, for that matter, apology? If the phrase "we regret" in a political context is not a report of sentiment, why should not the same go for "we forgive"? Griswold's semantic expulsion of forgiveness from the public realm has a question-begging air about it.
Nonetheless, Griswold's objection points to a deeper and more interesting problem. If Griswold is right, then we should not allow essentially psychological concepts to infect our discourse about public matters. But this would mean that we have to radically overhaul our vocabulary-if that is a realistic option at all.
From its very inception, the whole language of politics in the Western world has been permeated with terms and expressions that derive from nonpolitical contexts. We may talk of "friendship" between states, of legal "persons," and of votes of "no confi dence" in a perfectly intelligible (even if metaphorical) way. In this connection, we should observe that the same goes for the use of "trust" in the defi nition of political forgiveness given earlier-a point to be addressed in the next section. Th e fact that there is should perhaps rather alert us to the question of how fundamental the psychological element to the meaning of these terms actually is. It is so deep that we no longer realize that all our talk of "organization" ultimately refers to the way the "organs" of a living "organism" are arranged so that it can optimally discharge its function(s). Organizations still have "heads" and "members." In social practice and theory, metaphor is rampant-and perhaps for good reasons. At any rate, we seem perfectly able to use and understand these terms in both interpersonal and political contexts.
If "we apologize" and "we regret" may be speech acts that aim to repair relationships rather than expressing sentiments, there can be no principled objection to consider "we forgive" in the same way. In sum, there can be no fundamental objection against the use of the concept of political forgiveness in the present context. On the contrary, it has distinct advantages.
Political Forgiveness and (Political) Trust
In general, the concept of forgiveness allows us to recognize both the wrongness of an act or decision and the desirability of continuing a relationship based on trust. As noted, trust is another originally psychological concept that has proven its use in understanding the functioning of representative institutions. Some qualifi cations should therefore be appended to the use of this term. It is not husband and wife" at a wedding ceremony. However, this person has not created "hereby" a marriage. Th e conditions of satisfaction for a successful speech act of political forgiveness are the following. In the fi rst place, the forgiving party has the authority to perform that speech act, that is, to forgive. Th is authority, of course, is an institutional fact with normative implications. Second, because of the public character of political forgiveness, its utterance is subject to procedural constraints. Th ese constraints should ensure that the speech act is, in principle, publicly accessible. Just as a law is a not a law before it is publicly promulgated, an act of political forgiveness needs publicity in order to be an act of political forgiveness. Finally, the subjective states and attitudes of those performing it are irrelevant to the success of the speech act (Digeser 2001, 19-21) . Th is means that those meting out political forgiveness do not need to feel resentment toward the person to be forgiven. As will become clear presently, this is a consequence of the essentially public character of the speech act. Th is does not mean, however, that the state of mind of the person to be politically forgiven does not matter. As the fi rst paradox shows, it does matter. Actually, it matters a lot.
Taking these conditions of satisfaction into account, we can rehearse the defi nition of political forgiveness given earlier. As said, the concept of political forgiveness is here treated as a publicly performed performative speech act that aims to create the possibility for an offi cial to continue in offi ce despite his or her violation of the moral values embodied in the constitution. Th e relevance of the concept of forgiveness to the public sphere has long been recognized but also disputed. However, before I can proceed to formulate conditions of political forgiveness, I have to get out of the way a daunting objection to the application of the notion of forgiveness to the public sphere. Th is is an objection against condition (3) that renders irrelevant subjective states of those who dispense forgiveness.
Th e main problem for the application of the concept in the public sphere is that forgiveness seems to be an essentially psychological concept. Hannah Arendt, for instance, who clearly sees the relevance of forgiveness to the political, is acutely aware of its limitations because she takes forgiveness to be linked to love (1958, . If forgiveness is an essentially psychological concept, it natural to assume that it is at home, primarily or even exclusively, in the sphere of the interpersonal. Some even go so far as to deny that there is such a thing as political forgiveness at all. In an infl uential study of the subject, Henry Griswold argues that this categorical diff erence between the public and interpersonal spheres allows no scope for forgiveness in the former. What he prefers to call "political apology" is not even an imperfect (or "nonparadigmatic") version of forgiveness, despite the fact that they share some characteristics. Because forgiveness is conceptually dependent on sentiment or motive, one should avoid the term "forgiveness" in discourse about the public realm altogether. For one thing, the world of political institutions is too complex to assume that all parties are driven by the sentiments required to speak of forgiveness. For another, in the public sphere, authority is inextricably linked to the idea of representation, by means of which certain individuals apologize on behalf of (groups of ) others. Th ese representatives can and usually do perform such speech acts unburdened by the required feelings (resentment, a desire for revenge) (Griswold 2007, 59-71, 136-46; cf. Digeser 2001, 21) .
to, and therefore derivable from, basic confl icting moral claims embodied in the constitution. A crucial feature of the fi rst paradox is that the confl icts of values involved are attributable to the structure of the constitution. Th ey are, so to speak, internal to what it is to serve the state. Put diff erently, the confl ict should be clearly and objectively traceable to such constitutional values and not be the result of the offi cial's own faulty behavior.
Moreover, the relevant moral confl ict should not be a confl ict between public and private morality. In general, incompatibilities between private values (deriving from, say, the offi cial's religious convictions) and public values do not fall within the scope of political forgiveness. According to certain religious views, it is, for instance, not allowed to conclude same-sex marriages. An offi cial may suff er deep-ridden moral confl ict because of this. However, it is not a case that is the concern of this article-even though, perhaps, the civil servant himself will deny that this is not a matter for others to decide. If, on the other hand, his constitution embodies his religious creed, then it becomes another matter. Th is is not to say that this other type of confl ict is not real, important, painful, or in any other way worth engaging. It is just not the type of confl ict to which political forgiveness applies.
Given these assumptions, the following conditions of forgiveness can be formulated.
Political Forgiveness Is Not Justifi cation
As should be clear by now, forgiving an action or decision should be clearly distinguished from justifying it. It might be the case that, in everyday language, the term "to excuse" is often used indiscriminately with "to justify." In philosophical idiom, however, they are importantly diff erent. When I justify an action, I literally "make right" (iustifi care) that action. If it is justifi ed, a normally functioning agent will experience no remainder. In contrast, it makes no sense to say that I forgive your action if I mean to imply that the action was the right thing to do. Forgiving implies an acknowledgment of wrongness. Th is is one of the semantic features of the concept that make it particularly suited to the recognition of value pluralism of the liberal-democratic kind.
Th e procedure of forgiving, then, should make unambiguously clear that an unjustifi able wrong has been committed. On the other hand, it should also be evident that, given the circumstances of the decision, there was no alternative to performing it. Th is means that, as noted, the administration of political forgiveness should avoid the impression that each and every executive violation of a right can be forgiven by citizens. Only those wrongs that are, paradoxically, right can be forgiven. Th us, if Daschner had made the decision to respect the suspect's rights, in full awareness of the consequences, the same would hold. What counts in this type of confl ict is his awareness of the dilemma. 
Political Forgiveness Should Be Public
In general, forgiving should be carefully distinguished from forgetting. Th e public acknowledgment that a wrong has been done is therefore crucial. For this reason, an indispensable part of political forgiving should be some kind of public ritual. We can envisage uncommon to analyze the concept of forgiveness as an action or attitude restoring a relationship of trust that has been put under pressure by the commission of a wrong (Digeser 1998, 701) . Typically, such analyses focus on the psychological eff ort made by the victim to quench resentment or, as it is sometimes called in the literature, "a change of heart" (Calhoun 1992) . Some claim that forgiveness requires actual purging of resentment (Downie 1965; Murphy and Hampton 1988, 157) , others a commitment to do so (Haber 1991, 7) . Psychologically speaking, the reestablishment of trust is very diffi cult and, in many cases, a bridge too far. Th is is particularly the case if there are very direct connections between the wronged party, the wrong, and the wrongdoer.
However, there are no such immediate (or direct) connections in the kind of situation envisaged here. Th e citizen body, conceived as a collectivity, is not directly or immediately harmed by the violation of the rights of an individual. Nevertheless, this is not so say that the notion of trust does not play a role here. Th e role it plays is, for obvious reasons, very similar to the notion of trust as employed by the tradition of theorizing representative government (Pitkin 1967, 127-31) . In many liberal democracies, especially in parliamentary systems, institutionalized forms of trust are an integral element of the relationship between the executive and the legislative. It is one of the terms used to characterize a relationship vital to the exercise of (indirect) democratic control of the executive by the citizen body.
At this juncture, the second paradox asserts itself again. Suppose a minister of the interior who is responsible for torture administered by a police offi cial survives a vote of no confi dence in parliament. In a very real sense, this minister can be said to be politically forgiven, albeit indirectly, by citizens. Yet this is mainly, or even exclusively, a matter of political negotiation. Suppose, however, that the subordinate offi cial responsible for the actual decision to torture, made in an insoluble confl ict of values, has to resign as a result of a disciplinary measure. From the citizen perspective, this is awkward. If we are prepared to give responsible ministers the benefi t of the doubt on behalf of the citizen body, we should seriously consider whether this can be done for their subordinates as well. Why not allow them to reestablish the relationship of trust with the citizen body or its proxy?
It is not the purpose here to detail procedures for administering forgiveness for every form of liberal democratic government. Th is cannot be done at a general level. Such procedures are, and have to be, dependent on their particular legal and political contexts. However, one can specify conditions that have to be satisfi ed by any procedure for politically forgiving subordinate offi cials. Two constraints should guide the formulation of these conditions. Obviously, the conditions should take account of the nature of the paradoxes discussed earlier. Second, they should refl ect the relevant properties of the concept of political forgiveness. As noted, these properties follow from the citizen perspective. But they also have to respect more general features of being relevantly tied to value pluralism embodied in liberal democracy.
Conditions of Political Forgiveness
Generally speaking, political forgiveness should not be administered wantonly. To prevent this, forgiving should be logically connected
Forgiving an action or decision should be clearly distinguished from justifying it.
own. … Publicity is inappreciable, even when it does no more than prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly defendedthan compel deliberation, and force every one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actions" (1875, 84) . Th e chance that one will be politically forgiven may press individual decision makers to seek advice, to engage in collective deliberation-if the circumstances of the case allow it.
Second, the decision to politically forgive will itself have to be publicly supported by adequate reasons. Th e case must be compelling. Th is is important also for subsequent cases. In this way, the forgiving institution will gradually build a kind of repertoire of deliberative reasoning involved in executive decision making. Th is repertoire, in turn, may serve to provide deliberative reasons for decision making in the relevant type of cases in the future. However, this should not go so far as to constitute a kind of stare decisis. Previous decisions should not bind future decisions. Th is is to stress the singularity of the case. Forgiving should retain its exceptional character. For this reason, the selection of cases qualifying for the procedure, and therefore access to the procedure should be carefully regimented.
Political Forgiveness Should Be Preceded by Sincere Public Apology Directed to Citizens
Typically, apology is the correlative of forgiveness. In an interpersonal context, apology might not be a necessary condition of forgiving. In the context of private life, it is perfectly conceivable that one forgives in foro interno, while the wrongdoer shows no sign of contrition. Th is may even be considered a mental act of great nobility or charity. However, in a public procedure, it is important that both sides perform their proper speech acts and that they do so in the right order. To return to a point made earlier, one could be tempted to see apology and forgiveness as correlatives in a public or political context: no political forgiveness without political apology. But there is an interesting and crucial asymmetry. In the type of case under consideration, the apologizer (the offi cial) is an individual who is not represented by anyone else. His or her public apology has to be an expression of genuine regret, guilt, or shame. As noted, these feelings are part of the "remainders" that are the residues of decisions in moral dilemmas. At the other end of the line, those who forgive do represent the citizenry. In their case, forgiveness need not be an expression of (backward-looking) sentiments.
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, the ambition of this article is mainly diagnostic. I have attempted to fl esh out conditions of political forgiveness. A lot more eff ort is needed to translate these conditions into workable procedures and institutions. Another task lying ahead is the working out of the relationship between political forgiveness and forms of retributive and restorative justice. Th is is a technical task that cannot be undertaken here. But then again, the focus here is on the political dimension of forgiveness. Moreover, a serious investment has to be made in thinking of ways to prevent misuse of political forgiveness. As is the case with all political and administrative institutions, procedures for administering political forgiveness will not be impervious to manipulation. Yet this in itself should not be an argument to abandon the project; rather, it should be an incentive to think harder.
various ways of devising such a procedure. However, it is of the essence that dispensing forgiveness requires a performative speech act that, just like a promise, creates an institutional fact (Searle 1969 (Searle , 1995 (Searle , 2010 . If I say "I forgive," I do not report a state of aff airs; I create one. In the process, I commit myself to re-creating the relationship of trust that the person I forgive has put under pressure. So, even though citizens or their representative(s) are not obliged to forgive, once they do, they are under an obligation to act as if this relationship has been reestablished. At the same time, it does not create an obligation for the offi cial to remain in offi ce.
Another reason for making forgiving a public aff air is the following. As the aftermath of the Daschner case in Germany shows, events such as this serve to bring into sharp relief the very confl ict that is at the heart of liberal democracy. It is exactly in such cases that our most cherished practices and convictions are put to the test. Th at is why they have an important function in keeping alive the awareness about both our liberal and our democratic commitments. Th us, the public debate in German media stirred up at every stage of the torture case brought into focus all the important considerations involved in the discussion. Such public debates are tremendously important. Th ey force us to exhume the rational justifi cations for the things we are routinely doing-preventing our practices and convictions from solidifying into inarticulate dogmatism.
Political Forgiveness Should Be Rationally Justifi ed
Th e previous condition is intimately linked to the requirement that political forgiveness be adequately supported by reasons. But it is important to make a distinction between two sets of reasons, which of necessity fi gure in the administration of political forgiveness.
In the fi rst place, the offi cial to be forgiven will have to make public the reasons leading to his or her decision. Ideally, the reasons given in the procedure are identical with the reasons that actually fi gured in the decision-making process. It should be noted that these include not only the reasons that actually were decisive but also the reasons that were overruled. Th e importance of emphasizing and asserting the validity of the latter set of reasons in the procedure cannot be underestimated. Th is simply follows from the demand that the audience is persuaded that the offi cial's decision is the upshot of a dilemma that is both real and experienced as such.
Of course, in every process of rendering an account lurks the danger of misrepresenting actual decision making. Misrepresentation may be deliberate or the result of psychological mechanisms beyond conscious control. Th at is why it is important that witnesses are heard. Th e fact that testimony is hard to come by if such deliberations are the business of isolated decision makers explains the very urgency of this condition. If it is taken seriously, the prospect of political forgiveness exerts a disciplining force on the procedure of decision making in future cases. Rational justifi cation of decisions ex post facto may constrain the repertoire of considerations fed into the decision-making process. Th e public character of political forgiveness will, to many decision makers, in itself constitute a reason for marshalling adequate reasons for action. As John Stuart Mill puts it in his Considerations on Representative Government, "To be under the eyes of others-to have to defend oneself to others-is never more important than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have sure ground of their Forgiving public offi cials who make themselves guilty of a moral wrong so that they can remain in offi ce is a controversial idea. However, in this article, it is argued that under certain conditions, it might be worth taking it seriously. Th ere is something intolerably wrong with our theories about public integrity if we continue to remove those offi cials from public service who least deserve it. Of course, it would be an illusion to believe that we can expel all contingency from our moral universe. At any rate, this does not mean that we should not try to reduce the playground of blind fate. Tragedies may end with the demise of the hero, but the careers of public offi cials need not be ruined by tragic choices.
Notes
1. For a discussion of the implications of this convention for the Abu Ghraib case, see Adams, Balfour, and Reed (2006) .
2. Th e fact that versions of this confl ict appear in the works of preliberal thinkers can be taken as evidence for this deeper source of the confl ict. An example that is not proper to liberal democracy is one version of the so-called problem of dirty hands (Coady 2008; Kleinig 2007; Meisels 2008; Nagel 1972 Nagel , 1978 Shue 1977; Sutherland 2000; Th ompson 1987; Walzer 1973 Walzer , 2004 Weber 1992) . In essence, this problem is already dealt with by Augustine in his City of God and, of course, Machiavelli, most sharply in the Discourses.
3. An anonymous reviewer suggested that Daschner should have been aware of "the need for more of a public process in deciding what to do, which may well have led to a diff erent decision." Even if this were the case, that diff erent decision still would have not provided a way out of the dilemma. Th at is the nasty thing about this kind of confl ict of value. However, the way the public procedure of forgiving is organized should take care that decision makers will want to make sure that they have witnesses who will later be capable of reporting the actual course of the deliberations. So even if I have reservations in agreeing with the reviewer that it is unethical to decide alone, I do believe it is imprudent to do so.
